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USPTO for enablement? Third, did the court violate 35 U.S.C. § 282 by moving the
burden of proving § 112 enablement from the challenger to the patentee?

Copyright © 2005 The John Marshall Law School
,S

At~

Cite as Kristina A. Walker, Comment, To Be Presumed or Not to Be
Presumed... That Is the Enablement Question, 5 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 140 (2005).

To BE PRESUMED OR NOT TO BE PRESUMED... THAT Is THE
ENABLEMENT QUESTION
KRISTINA A. WALKER*

Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain
unaltered.1

INTRODUCTION

As is well established, claimed subject matter in a patent application is
examined by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") for
enablement, 2 and a patent is presumptively valid once issued by the USPTO. 3 To
overcome this presumption of validity, a party challenging the patent bears the
burden of proving the basis of invalidity due to anticipation by clear and convincing
evidence. 4 Therefore, one would assume that a party who claims a prior art patent
anticipates an invention would bear the burden of proving that the prior art patent is
J.D. Candidate, January 2007, The John Marshall Law School. B.S.E. in Industrial Engineering,
1997, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. I would like to thank Joanna Gunderson, Randy
Alexander, and Timir Chheda for their editorial assistance and Dan Lechleiter for introducing me to
this topic. I would also like to thank my family and Christopher Camerieri for their continuous
support.
1 Law Quotes-The Quotation Page,
http://www.quotationspage.com/subjects/laws/ (last
visited Nov. 13, 2005) (quoting Aristotle (384 BC-322 BC)).
2 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

PROCEDURE § 2164.08 (8th ed., 2nd rev. 2004) [hereinafter MPEP].
All questions of enablement are evaluated against the claimed subject
matter. The focus of the examination inquiry is whether everything within the
scope of the claim is enabled. Accordingly, the first analytical step requires that
the examiner determine exactly what subject matter is encompassed by the
claims. The examiner should determine what each claim recites and what the
subject matter is when the claim is considered as a whole, not when its parts are
analyzed individually.
Id. "The ultimate goal of the enablement requirement is to put the public in 'possession' of the
invention, by providing to persons of ordinary skill in the art a detailed description of how to make
and use the invention."

JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 139 (Erwin

Chemerinsky et al. eds., 2003). "The enabling disclosure .. . provides a type of blueprint that such
persons can follow once the patent expires and they are free to make and use the invention without
liability." Id.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). "A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the
validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even
though dependent upon an invalid claim." Id.
4 See State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir.
2003) ('A party seeking to establish that particular claims are invalid must overcome the
presumption of validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 by clear and convincing evidence."); Beckson Marine, Inc.
v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Because of the presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (282), a defendant must show invalidity by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence.");
Innovative Scuba Concepts, Inc. v. Feder Indus., Inc., 26 F.3d 1112, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating
the challenger of a patent's validity bears the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence).
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§ 112 enabled. 5 In light of Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., however, this
does not appear to be the situation.6 In Amgen, the Federal Circuit placed the
burden on the patentee to prove the prior art patent was invalid due to lack of § 112
enablement. 7 The patentee bears this burden even where unclaimed subject matter
8
of the prior art patent's specification is asserted to anticipate the patent at issue.
Was this assignment of burden merely dictum or not?9 Some courts have followed
Amgen in this respect, while other courts have disregarded it.10
The result of Amgen creates three points that warrant discussion. First, is
material in a printed publication equivalent to unclaimed material in a patent?
Second, is the holding in Amgen based on a false premise because it may accord a
presumption of § 112 enablement to material that has never been examined by the
USPTO for enablement? Third, did the court violate 35 U.S.C. § 282 by moving the
burden of proving § 112 enablement from the challenger to the patentee?
The background section provides useful information to understand Amgen's
ramifications. The analysis section discusses the three aforementioned topics that
were created by the Amgen decision. The proposal section suggests solutions to the
problems created by the court in Amgen. Lastly, the conclusion provides a
summarization of significant points.

5 Cf Robert A. Matthews, Jr., A New Presumption RegardingAnticipatoryPrior-Art Patents,
IP LITIGATOR, July/Aug. 2003, at para. 2 C[L]ogic suggests that a party asserting that a prior-art
reference anticipates a claimed invention bears the burden of proving . . . that the prior-art
reference provides an enabling disclosure."). For purposes of clarity in this article, the term § 112
enablement is used to describe a prior art patent and/or patent enabling itself, which is the
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112; the term anticipation is used to describe a prior art
reference that enables a patent. "[T]he phrase prior art can be understood at a very basic level as
the legally available technology and information with which the claimed invention will be compared,
in order to determine whether that invention is patentable." MUELLER, supra note 2, at 139.
Examples of prior art documents are patents and printed publications. See id.
6 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (placing the burden on the patentee to prove the prior art patent was not § 112 enabled).
7 Id. Enablement is
[t]he requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1 that a patent applicant describe in the
specification how to make and use the invention claimed therein in such "full,
clear, and concise, and exact terms" as to permit any person skilled in the art of
the invention to do so without undue experimentation.
MUELLER, supra note 2, at 372.
S See Matthews, supra note 5, at para. 3.
9 Gale R. Peterson & Derrick A. Pizarro, Recent Developments in PatentLaw- Decisions by
the US. CourtofAppeals for the Federal Circuit,11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 483, 505 (2003).
10 Compare Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 558, 581 (D.N.J. 2004)
("The patentee bears the burden of presenting evidence to convince the court that the prior art
patent did not enable the invention, and thus, that it is not anticipating."), andAlza Corp. v. Mylan
Labs., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 610, 630 (D. Vt. 2004) (placing the burden on patentee to produce
sufficient evidence of nonenablement to overcome the presumption of enablement), with Koito Mfg.
Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (placing the burden of proving
§ 112 enablement and anticipation on the accused infringer).
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I.BACKGROUND

Part A of the background section explains the process of acquiring a patent and
the shifting burden between the examiner and the applicant. Part B explains the
process of challenging the validity of a patent due to anticipation. Part C discusses
certain aspects of Amgen and the outcome of the case regarding the presumption of
§ 112 enablement.

A. The ProcessofAcquiring a Patent
When an inventor files a complete patent application with the USPTO, the
application is assigned to an examiner who performs the arduous task of determining
whether the conditions of patentability and other formal requirements are met.11
The requirements of patentability include that the claimed subject matter 12 be
useful, 13 nove 1 4 and non-obvious 15 . 16 In addition, the formal statutory requirements

11 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 11.01 (2004). The examiner conducts a search
of prior art and determines compliance with, in addition to the formal requirements, the substantive
and procedural requirements of patentability. See 1 id., Glossary.
12 An applicant for a patent must include in the specification accompanying the application for
the patent "one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention." 3 id. § 8.01.
Patent claims serve two functions. First, they define the invention for the purpose
of applying the conditions of patentability (eligible subject matter, originality,
novelty, utility, and nonobviousness), the statutory bars, and the disclosure
requirements. Second, they define the invention for the purpose of determining
infringement, that is, what constitutes the 'patented invention' that persons
cannot make, use or sell without the authority of the patent owner.

Id.
1:3See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." id.
' See 35 U.S.C § 102 (2000).
A
person
shall
be
entitled
to
a
patent
unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof
by
the
applicant
for
patent,
or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States
Id. § 102(a)-(b).
15 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.

-d. § 103(a).
164 CHISUM, supra note 11, § 11.01 n.1.
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must be satisfied before a patent can issue. 17 These include the requirement from 35
U.S.C. § 112 that the patent application must sufficiently describe, enable, and
enumerate the best mode of operating the invention. 18 To be enabling, the patent's
specification must include information regarding all aspects of the invention to teach
persons skilled in the art 19 how to make and use the invention without "undue
20
experimentation."
To ensure the patent application complies with the enablement requirement of
§ 112, all claims are examined by the USPTO. 21 However, unclaimed subject matter

17 4 id. § 11.01, n.1. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (stating the patent issuing
requirements in addition to the conditions of patentability, which are 35 U.S.C. § 101-103).
18 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.
Id. The best mode requirement requires the inventor to disclose in the patent application "the best
way known to the inventor on the application's filing date of carrying out the invention." MUELLER,
supra note 2, at 368. The requirement that the specification include a written description is
'separate and distinct from the enablement requirement." MPEP, supra note 2, § 2163. "The
written description requirement of the Patent Act promotes the progress of the useful arts by
ensuring that patentees adequately describe their inventions in their patent specifications in
exchange for the right to exclude others from practicing the invention for the duration of the patent's
term." Id. In addition "[t]his requirement for an adequate disclosure ensures that the public
receives something in return for the exclusionary rights that are granted to the inventor of the
patent." Id. § 2162.
19 The relative skill of those in the art refers to the skill of those in the art in relation
to the subject matter to which the claimed invention pertains at the time the
application was filed. Where different arts are involved in the invention, the
specification is enabling if it enables persons skilled in each art to carry out the
aspect of the invention applicable to their specialty.

Id. § 2164.05(b).
20 See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). "The fact that some experimentation
is necessary does not preclude enablement; what is required is that the amount of experimentation
Imust not be unduly extensive."' PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1984)). "Whether undue experimentation is needed is not a single, simple factual
determination, but rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations." In re
Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The following factors are to be considered in determining
"whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation":
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those
in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
of the claims.
Id. at 737.
21 MPEP, supra note 2, § 2164.08. Regarding the examination inquiry, "the first analytical
step requires that the examiner determine exactly what subject matter is encompassed by the
claims." Id. The examiner then "should determine what each claim recites and what the subject
matter is when the claim is considered as a whole, not when its parts are analyzed individually." Id.
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in the specification is not examined. 22

Moreover, this subject matter that is

"disclosed but not claimed in a patent application is dedicated to the public.

' 23

When rejecting a claim under the § 112 enablement requirement, the USPTO
bears the initial burden of asserting a prima facie case explaining why the scope of
protection provided by that claim is not enabled by the specification. 24 If the USPTO
meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the applicant to provide proof that the
claim is § 112 enabled. 25 If the applicant fails to rebut § 112 nonenablement, the
USPTO will reject the patent application. 26 However, if the applicant successfully
rebuts this presumption and has met all the patent requirements, then the USPTO
issues the claimed invention as a patent. 27 At this time, the patent is accorded a
presumption of validity. 28 This presumption is partly derived from the USPTO's
29
presumed proficiency at performing its job.

B. Challengingthe Validity of a PatentDue to AnticipationPriorto Amgen
Once the USPTO has issued the patent, a person having standing may challenge
the patent's validity. 30 A patent claim may be invalid due to anticipation if the
22 See id. § 2164.08. "All questions of enablement are evaluated against the claimed subject
matter." Id. Casual usage implies that the specification is distinct and separate from the claims;
however, the specification is a superset of the claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; 4 CHISUM, supra note 11,
§ 11.02. "The written description portion of a patent encompasses all of the patent specification's
content other than the claims (i.e., the written description includes those sections of the patent
specification that are typically labeled 'Background of the Invention,' 'Summary of the Invention,'
and 'Detailed Description of the Invention')." MUELLER, supra note 2, at 82.
23 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
[W]hat is not claimed is public property. The presumption is, and such is
generally the fact, that what is not claimed was not invented by the patentee, but
was known and used before he made his invention. . . . The public has the
undoubted right to use, and it is to be presumed does use, what is not specifically
claimed in the patent.
Id. at 1053.
24 In re Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561-62. This includes "providing sufficient reasons for doubting
any assertions in the specification as to the scope of enablement." Id. at 1562.
25 Id. (stating that a rejection can be overcome by providing "suitable proofs indicating that the
specification is indeed enabling").
26 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring that before the USPTO will issue a patent, the patent must
enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention).
27 See 4 CHISUM, supra note 11, § 11.01 n.1.
The useful, novelty, and non-obviousness
requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 must be satisfied. 4 id. "[T]he first paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 requires that the patent specification describe, enable, and set forth the best mode of carrying
out the invention." 4 id. "[T]he second paragraph of section 112 requires that the claims set forth
the subject matter that the applicant regards as his invention and that the claims particularly point
out and distinctly define the invention." 4 id.
28 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
29 Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
"In accordance with § 282, each of these statutory criteria for
patentability . . . also can serve as a basis for alleging invalidity of the issued patent." MUELLER,
supra note 2, at 297. These grounds include the failure to satisfy one or more of the statutory
criteria set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (statutory subject matter and utility), § 102 (novelty and no loss
of right) and § 103 (nonobviousness). Id. at 297. An issued patent may also be held invalid based on
a "failure to comply with any requirement of sections 112 or 251." Id. at 297-98. Therefore, it "may
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invention was patented or described in a printed publication before it was invented
by the patentee, 31 or if the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication more than one year prior to the filing date of the patent being
challenged. 32 A reference is considered a printed publication once the reference is
disseminated or at least made available to persons interested and ordinarily skilled
in the art.3 3 In order for the prior art reference to anticipate the patent claim, this
single reference must disclose each and every element of the challenged claim, either
expressly or inherently, 34 and the prior art must enable one skilled in the art to make
35
and use the invention.

be held invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1 if the specification is nonenabling, does not provide a
written description of the invention, or fails to disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention,
or under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
2 if the claims are indefinite." -d. at 298. "A patent reissued in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 251 is subject to the same constraints." Id. at 298. An accused
infringer or an interested third-party may challenge the patent's validity by raising an invalidity
defense in an infringement suit or request a declaratory judgment. 4 CHISULM, supra note 11,
§ 11.03.
31 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). "When one or more of the novelty provisions of § 102 is triggered,
patent attorneys say that the invention has been anticipated. When an invention has been
anticipated, it is old, and thus unpatentable. In other words, anticipation is the opposite of or
absence or negation of novelty." MUELLER, supra note 2, at 94. In a patent case, "that which will
[literally] infringe, if later, will anticipate, if earlier." Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d
718, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
32 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
"Section 102 uses the word 'invention' in two senses: to refer to the
anticipatory prior art invention, and to the app]ieant'sinvention for which a patent is being sought
(or in federal district court litigation challenging validity, the invention of the patent in suit)."
MUELLER, supra note 2, at 97.
33 In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (footnote omitted).
"[P]rinted publication" should be approached as a unitary concept. The traditional
dichotomy between "printing" and "publication" is no longer valied [sic]. Given the
state of technology in document duplication, data storage, and data-retrieval
systems, the "probability of dissemination" of an item very often has little to do
with whether or not it is "printed" in the sense of that word when it was
introduced into the patent statutes in 1836. In any event, interpretation of the
words "printed" and "publication" to mean "probability of dissemination" and
'public accessibility," respectively, now seems to render their use in the phrase
'printed publication" somewhat redundant.
Id. The reference's dissemination or availability must be such that "to the extent that persons
interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can
locate [the reference] and recognize and comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed
invention without need of further research or experimentation." Id.
34 If a prior art reference fails to disclose even one element of the claimed invention, then that
claimed invention is not anticipated. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc, 806 F.2d 1565,
1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
"Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or
includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates." MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d
1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere
fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not
sufficient. If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result
flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the
questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the disclosure should be
regarded as sufficient.
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To overcome the presumption of validity once a patent is issued, the party
challenging the patent bears the burden of proving anticipation by clear and
convincing evidence. 36 Clear and convincing evidence has been described as evidence
37
that persuades the fact-finder that the factual contention is "highly probable."
Considering the aforementioned, a party asserting a prior art reference as
anticipatory to the patent in suit ought to bear the burden of proving that the prior
art reference is § 112 enabled. 38 However, in Amgen Inc. v. Hoeehst Marion Roussel,
Inc., 39 the Federal Circuit ruled otherwise and placed the burden of proving the prior
40
art's lack of § 112 enablement on the patentee.

C. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.
Amgen Inc. ("Amgen"), the owner of several patents regarding the production of
erythropoietin ("EPO"), filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to impede
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. and Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. (hereinafter "TKT")
"from commercializing a competitive EPO product." 41 Amgen, the patentee, alleged
that TKT's Investigational New Drug Application infringed several of Amgen's
patents. 42 TKT denied infringement and counterclaimed that Amgen's patents were
invalid.43 To support TKT's counterclaim, TKT relied on a prior art patent, the '513
patent (hereinafter "Sugimoto),

44

which had similar disclosures to the patents

!-d. at 43-44. A skilled artisan is not required "to recognize the inherent characteristic in the prior
art that anticipates the claimed invention." Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
35 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
To
constitute prior art, a printed publication's disclosure of a claimed invention must be enabling. Elan
Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
However, the claimed invention that was disclosed is not required to be physically made to satisfy
the enablement requirement. Id.
36 See, e.g., State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed.Cir. 2002); Innovative Scuba
Concepts, Inc. v. Feder Indus., Inc., 26 F.3d 1112, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
37 Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Colorado v.
New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
'3 See Matthews, supra note 5.
39Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. is now known as Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc. Amgen Inc. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
40See Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355.
41 Id. at 1319. Erythropoietin is "a naturally occurring hormone that controls the formation of
red blood cells in bone marrow." Id.
42 Id.
Amgen alleged that TKT infringed the following patents: Patent Nos. 5,547,933 ("the
'933 patent"); 5,618,698 ("the '698 patent"); and 5,621,080 ("the '080 patent"). Id. "The complaint
was amended in October 1999 to include United States Patent Nos. 5,756,349 ("the '349 patent") and
5,955,422 ("the '422 patent"), which issued after suit was filed." Id.
43 Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 77 (D. Mass. 2001).
44 See Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1354. U.S. Patent No. 4,377,513 (filed August 1981) ("the '513
patent"). Id. This patent "discloses a means for fusing lymphoblastoid cells with kidney cells and
culturing them to produce EPO." Randy Morin, Legal Update: Recent Federal Circuit Decision
Concerning Erythropoetin (EPO): Amgen v. TKT, 9 B.U. J. Set. & TECH. L. 490, 497 (2003)
(discussing the Sugimoto reference).
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asserted by Amgen. 45 TKT raised Sugimoto even though Sugimoto had been before
the examiner during the prosecution of Amgen's patents. 46 Because TKT did not
prove Sugimoto's § 112 enablement, the district court found that Sugimoto was not
47

prior art.

On appeal to the Federal Circuit, TKT contended that the district court
committed error in placing the burden of proving Sugimoto's § 112 enablement on
TKT. 48 TKT reasoned that patents issued by the United States, "even those only
asserted as prior art in an invalidity defense, are presumed [§ 112] enabled under 35
U.S.C. § 282."49
Amgen argued "there should be no presumption of [§ 112]
enablement in this case because, under § 282, courts only presume the claimed
subject matter in a patent is [§ 112] enabled." 50 Therefore, Amgen argued, "no
presumption of [§ 112] enablement should apply" "because only the unclaimed
51
disclosures of Sugimoto are at issue"; hence, the burden properly fell on TKT.
The Federal Circuit agreed with TKT's argument that prior art patents are
presumed § 112 enabled. 52 However, the Federal Circuit relied on authority going
beyond § 282;53 the court relied on its own precedent holding a presumption of § 112
45 Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
4

6

Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1354.

[W]hen a party alleges that a claim is invalid based on the very same references
that were before the examiner when the claim was allowed, that party assumes
the following additional burden:
When no prior art other than that which was considered by the PTO
examiner is relied on by the attacker, he has the added burden of overcoming the
deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to have properly
done its job, which includes one or more examiners who are assumed to have some
expertise in interpreting the references and to be familiar from their work with
the level of skill in the art and whose duty it is to issue only valid patents.
Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000). "While the
presentation at trial of a reference that was not before the examiner does not change the
presumption of validity, the alleged infringer's burden may be more easily carried because of this
additional reference." SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharms. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355-1356
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
During patent prosecution, Amgen did present Sugimoto's non-enablement to overcome a
rejection. Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1356. However, Amgen used several arguments, and the examiner
did not state whether he agreed with this argument when he allowed the patent. Id. The Federal
Circuit concluded that because it "cannot assume the acceptance of every argument presented
during prosecution, the mere fact this argument was made is only minimally probative of the
enablement of Sugimoto." Id.
47 Id. at 1354. After a three day Markman hearing, the district court:
(i) construed the disputed claims; (ii) held each of the patents enforceable; (iii)
held the '080, '349, and '422 patents valid and infringed; (iv) held the '698 patent
not infringed; and (v) held the '933 patent not infringed or, in the alternative,
invalid for failure to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Id. at 1320. The court reasoned that "'In light of the intense competition that grew out of the race to
make human EPO suitable for treatment of chronic anemia, one would imagine that if Sugimoto's
invention were truly enabling, then he would have won that lucrative race."' Id. at 1354 (quoting
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 108 (D. Mass. 2001).
48
Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1354.
49 Id.

5oId. at 1355.

Id.
Id. at 1354.
r3 Id.
51
o2
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enablement existed "in both the claimed and the unclaimed disclosures in a prior art
patent."5 4 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit found that the burden of proving
Sugimoto was invalid due to lack of § 112 enablement should have rested on
55
Amgen.
In Amgen, the Federal Circuit relied on its precedent, In re Sasse, which
regarded patent prosecution. 56 The court reasoned that a presumption of § 112
enablement existed because during patent prosecution an examiner is allowed "to
reject application claims as anticipated by a prior art patent without conducting an
inquiry into whether" the patent is § 112 enabled or whether "it is the [patent's]
claimed material (as opposed to the unclaimed disclosures)" that are alleged to
anticipate the application claims. 57 Therefore, the Federal Circuit in Amgen held an
accused infringer to be similarly entitled, as isthe examiner in patent prosecution, to
a presumption of § 112 enablement for the unclaimed material in the prior art patent
asserted by the accused infringer. 58 The court stated that, also similar to the
applicant in patent prosecution, the patentee could overcome the presumption of
§ 112 enablement by presenting persuasive evidence that the prior art's relevant
claimed material or unclaimed disclosures are not § 112 enabled and hence, cannot
invalidate a claim. 59 The court noted its reasoning might also apply to prior art nonpatent printed publications. 60 However, that issue was not reached because the prior
61
art was a patent in this case.
The court also noted a policy reason for its decision that Amgen, the patentee,
bore the burden of proving § 112 nonenablement of Sugimnoto. 62 Specifically, the
court deemed it unwise "to force [the trial] court to conduct a mini-trial on the proper
claim construction of a prior art patent every time an allegedly anticipating patent
[was] challenged for lack of [§ 112] enablement." 63 The court further noted that
"because the presumption outlined [in Amgen did] not rely on § 282, [there was] no
64
reason to impose these burdens on litigants and the [trial] courts."
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court committed error by placing
the burden of proving Sugimoto's § 112 enablement on TKT. 65 However, the court

-d. at 1355. The Federal Circuit relied on its precedent, Jn re Sasso, 626 F.2d 675, 681

54

(C.C.P.A.
1980). See Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355.
5
Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355.

56 Soo id. (relying on In ro Sasse, 626 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980), which arose in the context
of ex parte prosecution).
57 Id.
"When the PTO cited a disclosure which expressly anticipated the present invention...
the burden was shifted to the applicant. He had to rebut the presumption of the operability of [the
prior patent] by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Sasse, 626 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
(citation omitted).
58 Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355.
F9Id.
60 Id.at 1355 n.22.
(1

d.

62 Id.at

1355 n.21.
Id. The court only mentioned this policy reason in a footnote. See id. The Federal Circuit
stated that because the court "frequently revisit[s] district courts' determinations in matters of claim
construction and validity, [it is] certainly aware that such a task [(mini-trials)] can occupy a great
deal of a court's resources." Id.
(

G4 d.

( Id. at 1356.
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held this error to be harmless for three of Amgen's patents. 66 But given the Federal
Circuit's earlier holdings, it vacated and remanded the issue of Sugimoto's
67
anticipation of one of the claims in another of Amgen's patents.
On remand, the district court addressed the term "presumption" in the Federal
Circuit's holding that an accused infringer should be entitled to a presumption of
§ 112 enablement for unclaimed material in the prior art patent. 68 The district court
noted that often in patent law, "this is not a true presumption at all, but rather a
burden shifting mechanism that places the burden of proving [§ 112] nonenablement
on the patentee." 69 When a "true presumption" exists, the presumption disappears
when the burden of production is met; 70 however, when a "burden shifting
mechanism" exists, the patentee has the burden of production as well as the burden
of persuasion to overcome the presumption7 1 The court concluded that Amgen could
rebut the presumption of Sugimoto's § 112 enablement by proving Sugimoto lacked
72
§ 112 enablement by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
The decision in Amgen produced a dramatic effect on how parties litigate. Was
the assignment of the enablement presumption to a prior art disclosure merely
dictum or not? This requires resolution; otherwise, confusion arises as to who bears
the burden of proving whether the prior art patent is § 112 enabled. If the
assignment is not dictum, and thus controlling, then the decision must be reversed
because the court violated § 282 by moving the burden of proving § 112 enablement
from the challenger to the patentee.

II.

ANALYSIS

Three topics of discussion are created by the decision in Amgen. The first topic
is whether material in a printed publication is equivalent to unclaimed material in a
6

Id.

After the district court analyzed enablement and found "the relevant unclaimed

disclosures of Sugimoto nonenabled, the court nevertheless conducted a full anticipation analysis."
Id. The court found that "none of the cited references disclose [sic] each and every limitation of any
of Amgen's individual claims."' Id. (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F.
Supp. 2d 69, 109 (D. Mass. 2001).
67 Id. Sugimoto did not anticipate claim 1 of the '422 patent. Id.; see Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 202, 307 (D. Mass. 2004) (holding on remand that "Amgen has
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Sugimoto is not enabled-that is, that Sugimoto's
specification does not teach skilled artisans how to make and use the entire scope of the claimed
invention without undue experimentation").
68 Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 202, 305 (D. Mass. 2004).
69 Id. at 305 n.124 (citation omitted); see Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 287 F.
Supp. 2d 126, 131-32 (D. Mass. 2003) (criticizing the recurrent imprecision of the term
'presumption").
70 Amgen, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 132. The burden of production is met when "the party with the
burden presents evidence to rebut the presumed fact." Id.
71 Id. at 131-32. For the burden of persuasion, the party must persuade the court of its fact.

Id.
72 Amgen, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 306 n.125. But see Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v.
Weatherford Int'l, Inc., No. 302CV1347-N, 2003 WL 22017187, at *1-U2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2003)
(interpreting the Federal Circuit's holding in Amgen "to teach that the patentee only has the burden
of going forward to present some material evidence which places the enablement of the prior art in
question, i.e., the burden of production").
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patent. The second topic is whether Amgen is based on a false premise because it
affords unclaimed material a presumption of § 112 enablement. The last topic is
whether Amgen violated 35 U.S.C. § 282 by moving the burden of proving § 112
enablement from the challenger to the patentee.

A. Materialin a PrintedPublicationIs Equivalentto UnclaimedMaterialin a
Patent
In Amgen, the Federal Circuit noted that the court's reasoning behind its
holding that a prior art patent's unclaimed material is accorded a presumption of
§ 112 enablement might also logically extend to prior art non-patent printed
publications.7 3 Although the Federal Circuit did not decide this issue,7 4 one could
support the argument that material in a printed publication is equivalent to
unclaimed material in a patent by comparing the examination and public aspect of
the two.
The USPTO examines all claims to determine whether everything within the
scope of the claim is § 112 enabled.7 5 Considering that the claims define the
patentee's scope of patent protection, the patent's claim requirement assumes that
the invention is delineated in the claims, not in the specification; 76 Thus, when an
applicant discloses subject matter but fails to claim it, the USPTO is deprived of the
opportunity to consider whether the disclosures are § 112 enabled. 77
Similar to unclaimed disclosures in a patent, material in a printed publication is
not examined for enablement. Indeed, "'[t]he statutory phrase "printed publication"
has been interpreted to mean that before the critical date the reference must have
been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art."'7 8

Therefore,

dissemination and public accessibility, not the reference's § 112 enablement, are the

73 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
74 [d. The Federal Circuit did not decide

Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 n.22 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
whether the presumption of enablement for the prior
art patent's unclaimed material also applied to prior art printed publications because the prior art
at issue, Sugimoto, was in fact a patent in this case. Id.
7, MPEP, supra note 2, § 2164.08 ("All questions of enablement are evaluated against the
claimed subject matter.").
76Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
77 See id.at 1051. Where an applicant disclosed alternatives in her patent application but
failed to claim them, the USPTO "was deprived of the opportunity to consider whether these
alternatives were patentable." Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus,
the applicant dedicated the use of these alternatives to the public. !-d. However, a patentee is not
left without a remedy if the patentee unintentionally fails to claim disclosed subject matter.
Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1055. "Within two years from the grant of the original patent, a
patentee may file a reissue application and attempt to enlarge the original scope of the claims to
include the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter." Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). "In addition,
the patentee can file a separate application claiming the disclosed subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 120 (2000)." Johnson &Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1055.
78 In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d
1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989). "Patent attorneys refer to the date that is one year prior to the
application filing date as the eritical date for § 102(b) purposes." MUELLER, supra note 2, at 103
(emphasis added).
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indicators of whether a prior art reference is "published."79 Also, material in a
printed publication is available to the public in the same way as a patent's unclaimed
subject matter.80 Therefore, unclaimed material in a patent is equivalent to material
in a printed publication because both are available to the public and neither was
required to be analyzed to ensure the material is § 112 enabled.

B. The Amgen Holding Is Based on a False Premise
Neither unclaimed material in a patent nor material in a printed publication is
required to be examined for § 112 enablement. Consequently, the question is
whether Amgen's holding isbased on a false premise as it affords a presumption of
§ 112 enablement to material that has never been examined for enablement.
The Federal Circuit held the accused infringer to be entitled to a presumption of
§ 112 enablement for both the claimed and unclaimed material in the prior art patent
81
asserted by the accused infringer to challenge the validity of the patent in suit.
However, during patent prosecution, the examiner only inspects the claimed subject
matter for § 112 enablement.8 2 There is no requirement for the examiner to inspect
the unclaimed disclosures.83 Accordingly, the claims of a patent (as opposed to the
unclaimed disclosures) enjoy the presumption of validity.8 4 When Sugimoto was
before the USPTO during the prosecution of Amgen's patents, the examiner
inspected its claims, not the unclaimed material for § 112 enablement. Therefore,
Amgen based its holding on a false premise by giving a presumption of § 112
enablement to material that had never been required to be examined for enablement.

C. Can the Court Remove the EnablementElement ofAnticipation Without
Violating 35 U.S.C § 282?
A prior art reference can anticipate a claimed invention during patent
prosecution and an issued patent during patent litigation.8 5 However, in patent
prosecution, § 282 does not apply as it does in patent litigation.8 6 Accordingly, did
the Federal Circuit in Amgen violate § 282 by moving the burden of proving § 112
enablement from the challenger to the patentee?

79 In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1348. "Public accessibility has been the criterion by which a
prior art reference will be judged for the purposes of § 102(b)." Id. at 1350. Many times, courts find
it useful to rely on distribution and indexing as alternatives for public accessibility. Id. However,
these are not the only factors in determining whether the reference is a "printed publication." Id.

80See Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1051; Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1106.
81 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
82 MPEP, supra note 2, § 2164.08 ("All questions of enablement are evaluated against the
claimed subject matter.").
83 See id.
84 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or

multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims.").
8" See MUELLER, supra note 2, at 297 (stating the statutory criteria for patentability also can
serve as a basis for alleging invalidity of the issued patent).
8c,See -enerally35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ('A patentis presumed valid.") (emphasis added).
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After an anticipation rejection during patent prosecution, a shifting burden of
proof exists. 8 7 Unfortunately, on account of a prior art patent's presumption of § 112

enablement in prosecution, the USPTO neither inquires whether the prior art patent
is actually § 112 enabled nor distinguishes whether it is the prior art patent's
claimed material (as opposed to the unclaimed disclosures) that allegedly anticipates
the claimed invention at any point in the burden shifting analysis. 88 First, the
USPTO satisfies its initial burden by citing a patent that expressly anticipates the
claimed invention. 89 Subsequently, the burden shifts to the patent applicant to rebut
the presumption that the prior art patent is § 112 enabled. 90 If the applicant
successfully rebuts this presumption and has met all the patent requirements, the
USPTO issues a patent. 91
Only after a patent is issued by the USPTO may the patent enjoy a statutory
presumption of validity under § 282.92 In patent litigation, as opposed to prosecution,
a party challenging the validity of a patent bears the burden of proving such
93
invalidity.
The distinction between patent prosecution and patent litigation becomes
important when considering why the Federal Circuit in Amgen erroneously relied on
its precedent, In re Sasse.94 The Amgen court held the accused infringer to be
similarly entitled, as is the USPTO in patent prosecution, to a presumption of § 112
enablement of the unclaimed material in the prior art patent asserted by the accused
infringer. 95
However, the court used an erroneous analogy between patent
prosecution and patent litigation. During patent prosecution, the claimed invention
has not been issued by the USPTO as a valid patent; hence, the claimed invention is
not entitled to a statutory presumption of validity under § 282.96 At this time, § 282
is not being violated by shifting the burden of proving the prior art reference's lack of
§ 112 enablement because the claimed material is not afforded a presumption of
validity. Therefore, the patent enjoys the presumption of validity only during patent
87 See

In re Sasse, 626 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980).

88Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
89In re Sasse, 626 F.2d at 681.
90 See id.

91 See 4 CHISUM, supra note 11, § 11.01 n.i. The useful, novelty, and non-obviousness
requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 must be satisfied. 4 id. Additionally, the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 112 must be satisfied. 4 id.
92 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). "A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether
in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of
the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even
though dependent upon an invalid claim." Id.
93 Id. "The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the
party asserting such invalidity." Id.
91 See 1 CHISUM, supranote 11, § 3.04(1)(b)(v).

While numerous courts have stated that prior art references are entitled to a

presumption of enablement, see, e.g., Ciba Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., 864 F. Supp.
429, 438 (D.N.J. 1994), affd in pertinent part, vacated in part, 68 F.3d 487 (1995);
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands. Inc., 711 F. Supp. 759, 772 (D. Del.
1989); Rockwell, No. 93542C, 1997 WL 50614, at *28 (Ct. C1. 1997), these courts
have each relied incorrectly upon In re Sasse ....
1Id.

95

Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355.
96 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 ("A patent shall be presumed valid.") (emphasis added).
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litigation. 97 Because the examiner only inspects the claimed subject matter (as
opposed to the unclaimed disclosures) in the application for § 112 enablement, 98 after
the patent issues, the presumption that the claims are § 112 enabled is encompassed
in the presumption of validity. 99 As such, in patent litigation, because the party
challenging the patent's validity bears the burden of proving such invalidity, the
same party should also bear the burden of proving whether the prior art patent is
§ 112 enabled. 100 Therefore, Amgen incorrectly relied on In re Sasse because patent
prosecution is not analogous to patent litigation in that § 282 does not apply in
patent prosecution.
Considering Amgen improperly relied on its precedent, In re Sasse, the Federal
Circuit violated § 282 by moving the burden of proving § 112 enablement from TKT
to Amgen. The Federal Circuit glossed over this violation with the words "We agree
that prior art patents are presumed enabled, but under authority going beyond
§ 282."101 However, a finer distinction is required. While this presumption of § 112
enablement applies to the patent claims, the presumption does not apply to
unclaimed disclosures. 10 2 There is no requirement for the examiner to inspect the
10 3
unclaimed disclosures.
Therefore, the Amgen court not only incorrectly moved the presumption of § 112
enablement to the wrong party, the court incorrectly afforded this presumption a
broader scope then intended by § 282 without sufficient basis (an inapposite In re
Sasse).
The Federal Circuit also grounded its decision that Amgen bore the burden of
proving the prior art patent's (Sugimoto's) lack of § 112 enablement in policy
considerations.10 4 Cognizant that conducting mini-trials regarding proper claim
construction diminishes a trial court's resources, the Federal Circuit thought it
unwise to compel these courts to perform such a task for "a prior art patent every
10 5
time an allegedly anticipating patent is challenged as lack[ing § 112] enablement."
This policy consideration lacks substance. A trial court will not be required to
perform claim construction on all prior art patents because the invalidity by
anticipation analysis does not require it. Invalidity by anticipation analysis is a two
step process.10 6 The first step requires construction of the claims of the patent at
issue. 10 7 The second step requires a "comparison of the properly construed claims to
the prior art."10 8 Thus, the at-issue patent's claims are construed, not the prior art
97 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 ("Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or
multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims.").
98 See MPEP, supra note 2, § 2164.08 ("All questions of enablement are evaluated against the
claimed subject matter.").
99 See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
100 See id.
101Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
102 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 ("Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or
multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims.").
103See MPEP, supra note 2, § 2164.08.
104 Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355 n.21.
105 Id.
106 Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
107 Id.
108 Id. There is symmetry between the tests for infringement and invalidity by anticipation.

See 1 CHISUM, supra note 11, § 3.02(1)(f).
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patent's. This becomes clearer when one considers that anticipation involves any
prior art reference, not only prior art patents. Generally, a prior art non-patent
reference will not entail claims. Considering the aforementioned analysis is the same
no matter what the prior art, it makes sense that the prior art patent's claims would
not be construed. Thus, the Federal Circuit's conclusion that the courts would be
burdened if there was no presumption of § 112 enablement for a prior art patent was
improperly based.

III. PROPOSAL
First, the proposal section discusses cases that have followed or ignored Amgen.
Second, this section suggests solutions to the problems created by the court in
Amgen.
Amgen held that an accused infringer should be entitled to a presumption of
§ 112 enablement for the unclaimed material in the prior art patent that the accused
infringer asserts against the patent holder. 10 9 The Federal Circuit's decision was
based on a false premise as it afforded a presumption of § 112 enablement to material
that had never been examined for enablement. Also, the court violated § 282 by
moving the burden of proving § 112 enablement from the challenger to the patentee.
Due to this false premise and violation of § 282, the assignment of burden of proof in
Amgen must be reversed or otherwise treated as dictum. 110 However, if Amgen is
found to be controlling on that issue, subsequent courts should not extend the § 112
enablement presumption to prior art non-patent printed publications.
Since the decision in Amgen, some courts have followed its reasoning, while
other courts have disregarded it. al l Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, which
A simple example will illustrate the infringement test for anticipation.
Assume that A invents and patents the ordinary lead pencil. Later, B invents and
seeks a patent on a pencil with an attached eraser. Does A's prior device
anticipate B's invention and hence preclude issuance of a valid patent? The classic
infringement test requires a determination whether A's device (the pencil) would
have infringed B's claim had it been made later in time. That determination
requires construction of Bs claims: does B claim only the improvement
(combination of pencil and eraser) or the pencil itself-with or without eraser? If
the former, A's device would not infringe and hence does not anticipate. If the
latter, A's device would infringe and hence does anticipate.
1 id. (emphasis added).
10
9 Amgon, 314 F.3d at 1355.
110 Peterson, supra note 9, at 505.
In what is almost assuredly dicta in Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
the court held ....
that "an accused infringer should be similarly entitled [as is
the PTO during [patent] . . . prosecution] to have the district court presume the
enablement of unclaimed (and claimed) material in a prior art patent defendant
asserts against a plaintiff."
Id.
111 Compare Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 558, 581 (D.N.J. 2004)
("The patentee bears the burden of presenting evidence to convince the court that the prior art
patent did not enable the invention, and thus, that it is not anticipating."), andAlza Corp. v. Mylan
Labs., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 610, 630 (D. Vt. 2004) (placing the burden on patentee to produce
sufficient evidence of nonenablement to overcome the presumption of enablement), with Koito Mfg.
Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

[5:140 2005]

To Be Presumed or Not to Be Presumed

was decided a year and a half after Amgen,11 2 made no reference to the Amgen
decision, thereby not even distinguishing Koito from Amgen. 113 Koito Manufacturing
Company ("Koito") brought a declaratory judgment action against Turn-Key-Tech
("Turn-Key") "requesting that Turn-Key's '268 patent1 14 be declared invalid" due to
anticipation and lack of enablement. 115 Subsequently, Turn-Key counterclaimed for
infringement. 116 The district court upheld the jury's special verdict that the '268
patent was invalid. Turn-Key appealed arguing "that Koito did not meet its burden
of showing anticipation . . . by clear and convincing evidence." 117

Koito cross-

appealed seeking to invalidate all claims of the '268 patent. 118 Turn-Key, the
patentee, argued that the district court erred because Koito only submitted into
evidence the allegedly anticipatory reference, which was an unexamined patent
application ("JP '082").119 The Federal Circuit concluded that Koito, the accused
infringer, did not meet its burden because Koito failed to present testimony or other
evidence demonstrating how the JP '082 anticipated the '268 patent or how the JP
'082 reference was § 112 enabled. 120 Thus, Koito had the burden of proving the JP
121
'082 was § 112 enabled and anticipated the '268 patent.
Alza Corporation v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. is among the cases that have
followed Amgen. The district court afforded a presumption of § 112 enablement to
the prior art patent. 122 Thus, Alza Corporation, the patentee, bore the burden of
123
proving the prior art patent's lack of § 112 enablement.
Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals,Inc v. Bio-Technology General Corp. is a case
that originally followed Amgen in placing the burden on Novo Nordisk
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Novo Nordisk"), the patentee, to prove the prior art reference
lacked § 112 enablement. 124 However, due to the subsequent appellate history, the
case is now distinguishable. In the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the district
court's opinion, the district court had not exclusively relied on the presumption in
Amgen in determining that the Pavlakis 1981 article, a prior art non-patent

112

See Koito, 381 F.3d at 1142. Koito was decided on August 23, 2004. Id.

113 See id. (citing no reference to Amgen).

at 1144. The '268 patent is U.S. Patent No. 5,045,268. d. at 1145.
at 1147. Koito is a manufacturer of taillights that are used by many Japanese
automakers. Id. at 1147. Koito's lenses, which are a component of the taillights, are at issue in this
case. -d. At the time of this action, "Koito alleged that Turn-Key had accused Koito of infringement
and already filed suit against some of Koito's customers." Id. For purposes of this section,
anticipation is only being discussed for Koito's grounds for declaring the '268 patent invalid. See
generallyKoito,381 F.3d 1142 (describing case in entirety).
116 Id. at 1147.
117 Id. at 1148.
114 fd.
115 Id.

Id.
119Id. at 1151. "JP'082" is the Japanese Unexamined Application No. 148,082. Id. at 1145.

118

120

See id.at 1151.

121

See id. "Typically, testimony concerning anticipation must be testimony from one skilled in

the art and must identify each claim element, state the witnesses' interpretation of the claim
element, and explain in detail how each claim is disclosed in the prior art reference." Id. at 1152.
"General
and conclusory testimony... does not suffice as substantial evidence of invalidity." Id.
12 2
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 610, 630 (D. Vt. 2004).
123 Soo id.
124 Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Technology Gen. Corp., No. 02-332-SLR, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14960, at *73 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 2004).
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publication, was § 112 enabled. 125 The district court had concluded that the Pavlakis
1981 article was § 112 enabled and anticipated the patent because Dr. Pavlakis,
using the disclosures from his article, actually physically created the patent's subject
matter.126 Therefore, any presumption that can be inferred in this case is dictum
because the finding of Pavlakis 1981 article's § 112 enablement was found on grounds
beyond the Amgen presumption.
Amgen, Koito, and Alza were patent litigation cases. Alza followed Amgen,
which incorrectly relied on a patent prosecution case for its holding. Accordingly,
Alza was also based on a false premise, and the court in Alza also violated § 282 by
moving the burden of proving § 112 enablement from the challenger to the patentee.
However, in Koito, the party challenging the validity of the patent bore the burden of
proving § 112 enablement. Thus, § 282 was not violated. Therefore, Koito is the
better decision and should be the controlling case.
If Amgen is still the controlling case, subsequent courts should not extend the
§ 112 enablement presumption to prior art printed publications.
Considering
unclaimed material in a patent is equivalent to material in a printed publication,
especially in the respect that neither is required to be scrutinized for § 112
enablement, Amgen's decision is based on a false premise. Subsequent courts do not
need to expand the error of the Federal Circuit by giving even more material a
presumption of § 112 enablement that has never been examined for enablement.

IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Amgen has left patent litigants wondering which presumption
controls. Is it the presumption of validity of the patentee's patent or the presumption
of § 112 enablement of the prior art patent asserted by the accused infringer?
Subsequent courts have not been consistent in applying Amgen's decision of allowing
an accused infringer to be entitled to a presumption of § 112 enablement for both the
claimed and unclaimed material in a prior art patent that the accused infringer
asserts against the patent holder. 127 This inconsistency crystallizes the question of
whether Amgen's assignment of the burden of proving § 112 nonenablement to the
patent holder is merely dictum or not. The Amgen court not only incorrectly moved
the presumption of § 112 enablement to the wrong party, the court incorrectly
afforded this presumption a broader scope than intended by § 282 without sufficient
basis. Therefore, though Amgen has been written down, it should not remain
unaltered.

125 Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Technology Gen. Corp., No. 04-1581, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21518, at *22 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 5, 2005).
126 Td. at 22-23.
127 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (regarding
the holding in Amgen).

